Joe Bache

Joe Bache

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Joseph (Joe) Bache was born in Sourbridge on 8th February 1880. He played local football for Bewdley Victoria and Stourbridge before joining Aston Villa in December 1900.

Bache, an inside-forward, made his debut in the 1900-01 season. He became a regular in the team the following season and formed a great partnership with the Villa centre-forward, Harry Hampton.

Bache won his first international cap for England against Wales on 2nd March, 1903. The England team included Bob Crompton, Billy Garraty, Albert Houlker and Vivian Woodward. England won 2-1 and Bache scored one of the goals.

Aston Villa finished 4th in the 1904-05 season. Bache scored 12 goals in 31 games. Harry Hampton was top scorer with 15 in 22 appearances. That season Villa reached the FA Cup Final. Over 100,000 people watched Villa beat Newcastle United 2-0. Both goals were scored by Hampton.

In the 1907-08 season Aston Villa finished as runners-up to Manchester United in the First Division of the Football League. That year Bache ended up as the club's top scorer with 24 goals in 32 games.

Tony Matthews described Bache in his book, Who's Who of Aston Villa as: "A cultured inside-forward... Bache had few equals in the art of dribbling, although at times he could be somewhat selfish. A good tempered, brainy footballer he displayed a masterly technique on the pitch."

The Bache and Harry Hampton partnership reached its peak in the 1909-10 season when Aston Villa won the First Division title. That season Hampton scored 29 goals in 35 games, whereas Bache managed 22 in 35.

Bache won his last international cap for England against Scotland on 1st April, 1911. The game was drawn 1-1. Over a eight year period Bache score four goals in seven games.

In the 1912-13 season Aston Villa finished as runners-up to Sunderland. The club scored 86 goals with the main contributors being Harry Hampton (25), Harold Halse (21) and Clem Stephenson (14).

Aston Villa beat Derby County (3-1), West Ham United (5-0), Crystal Palace (5-0), Bradford City (5-0), Oldham (1-1) to reach the FA Cup Final against Sunderland in 1913. Over 120,000 saw Aston Villa win the game 1-0.

Bache's playing career was brought to an end by the First World War. He worked as a player/coach for Grimsby Town (1920-21) before moving to Germany where he trained Rot-Weiss and Mannheim. Bache was also Aston Villa's reserve-team coach (1927-28).

Bache was also the landlord of the Traveller's Rest (Aston) and the Coaching House (Evesham).

Joseph Bache died on 10th November 1960.

There are 41 census records available for the last name El Bache. Like a window into their day-to-day life, El Bache census records can tell you where and how your ancestors worked, their level of education, veteran status, and more.

There are 1 immigration records available for the last name El Bache. Passenger lists are your ticket to knowing when your ancestors arrived in the USA, and how they made the journey - from the ship name to ports of arrival and departure.

There are 74 military records available for the last name El Bache. For the veterans among your El Bache ancestors, military collections provide insights into where and when they served, and even physical descriptions.

There are 41 census records available for the last name El Bache. Like a window into their day-to-day life, El Bache census records can tell you where and how your ancestors worked, their level of education, veteran status, and more.

There are 1 immigration records available for the last name El Bache. Passenger lists are your ticket to knowing when your ancestors arrived in the USA, and how they made the journey - from the ship name to ports of arrival and departure.

There are 74 military records available for the last name El Bache. For the veterans among your El Bache ancestors, military collections provide insights into where and when they served, and even physical descriptions.

The Mess At Pru Bache

George L. Ball&aposs reign is over at Pru-Bache--but his era lives on. After nine years as CEO, Ball resigned on Feb. 13, leaving behind more than $250 million in losses and one nasty mess for Pru-Bache&aposs parent, Prudential Insurance Co. of America.

Pru-Bache and Prudential face legal troubles that could drag down their finances--and images--for years to come. Prudential-Bache Securities Inc. sold more than $6 billion in limited partnerships to more than 100,000 investors during Ball&aposs time. But plummeting values of the underlying investments and stiff up-front fees and commissions have taken their toll. Today, these partnerships may be worth less than $3 billion.

Investors already have named Pru-Bache in over 100 lawsuits claiming more than $2 billion in damages, according to plaintiffs&apos attorneys. Even a group of former Pru-Bache brokers is preparing a lawsuit alleging they were damaged by the way the firm administered and marketed its limited partnerships.

SERIOUS QUESTIONS. The damage goes deeper. In an investigation including interviews with more than 100 current and former Pru-Bache employees and customers, BUSINESS WEEK has learned of possible conflicts of interest involving James J. Darr, 44, a little-known but ambitious executive who headed Pru-Bache&aposs limited partnership unit from 1979 to 1988. Executives who worked for Darr say that Ball left Darr alone to build his empire because the unit was so profitable. BUSINESS WEEK&aposs investigation suggests that Darr&aposs relationships with some real estate developers may have compromised his responsibility to find the best partnerships to sell to Pru-Bache customers. Serious questions also exist about whether Pru-Bache and Prudential properly disclosed these potential conflicts of interest. In fact, Prudential has initiated its own independent investigation.

According to documents obtained by this magazine, Darr invested in joint ventures with George S. Watson, a Texas developer who sold his partnerships through Pru-Bache. Former senior employees of Watson&aposs company assert that one of the deals was a low-risk and lucrative transaction made to induce Darr to continue doing business with the developer. Even if it wasn&apost intended as an inducement, this alleged transaction raises disclosure questions: Darr&aposs personal investment dealings with Watson were not made known in offering documents for a subsequent limited-partnership fund co-sponsored by the Dallas developer&aposs company and Pru-Bache. Nor was the fact that Darr obtained $2.1 million in mortgage loans for his home in Connecticut from an Arkansas savings and loan in which Watson and his partner, A. Starke Taylor III, were major shareholders.

Darr, who left Pru-Bache at the end of 1988, has not been named in the many lawsuits examined by this magazine and declined to be interviewed. In a written statement to BUSINESS WEEK, his attorney, Stuart Perlmutter, said: "These allegations are absolutely and completely untrue. Mr. Darr never requested, demanded, or received any personal compensation from general partners, prospective general partners, or others who wanted to sell partnerships or other investments through the Pru-Bache system." In a separate letter Watson said: "I have never known Mr. Darr to demand or receive special personal compensation."

UNAVAILABLE. Actions by Pru-Bache and parent company Prudential also raise some questions. The brokerage firm provided limited disclosure to investors about the involvement of Darr and five other Pru-Bache executives in a New York hotel deal that benefited them while rescuing one of the Texas developers from a debt crunch. Pru-Bache also gave Darr a clean bill of health in a National Association of Securities Dealers filing after he left the firm in 1988. In doing so, it may have violated an NASD regulation by failing to disclose that Pru-Bache had hired an outside law firm to investigate Darr&aposs land transactions in 1988. And while Prudential Insurance stopped investing in Prudential-Bache Energy Income funds in 1986 after Prudential executives raised questions about Darr, Pru-Bache customers were never told of those concerns. Individual investors in those funds ended up having their payouts slashed because of poor results.

Darr also seemed to exhibit poor judgment by selecting Dallas real estate developer Clifton S. Harrison, who sold $100 million in partnerships through Pru-Bache. Pru-Bache failed to disclose to investors that Harrison pleaded guilty in 1967 to a felony count of embezzlement. Both Texas development companies&apos partnerships have proved to be costly for investors.

Prudential, responding for itself and Pru-Bache, refuses to discuss any matter that deals directly with Darr. Prudential Chairman Robert C. Winters has declined interview requests from BUSINESS WEEK since early in January. Told on Feb. 19 that this article was imminent, a Prudential spokesman said Winters and Robert A. Beck, a former Prudential chairman who was named interim CEO at Pru-Bache after Ball resigned, were visiting the firm&aposs branch managers and unavailable for interviews.

By 1988, Pru-Bache learned of Darr&aposs alleged misconduct, and it hired the Dallas law firm of Locke Purnell Rain Harrell to investigate his land investments. But it&aposs not clear how long executives at Prudential headquarters in Newark, N. J., have known of these allegations. A Prudential spokesman insists that the departure of Ball, who also declined to comment, had nothing to do with questions first posed by BUSINESS WEEK in early January about alleged irregularities in Pru-Bache&aposs limited-partnership operation. However, the New York law firm of Davis Polk & Wardwell has been retained by Prudential to investigate allegations about Pru-Bache&aposs limited-partnership group, including "transactions involving Jim Darr and Watson & Taylor," says a Feb. 7 letter to one former Watson & Taylor employee from David D. Brown IV of that law firm. Three former Pru-Bache executives who had worked in direct investment say they were contacted by Davis Polk lawyers in mid-January and asked specific questions about Darr.

The Darr matter could be costly even for deep-pocketed Prudential, with its $160 billion in assets. Before the allegations involving Darr became known, Lipper Analytical Securities Corp. analyst Perrin H. Long was estimating that legal expenses and settlements in partnership-related cases could cost Prudential $1.2 billion over several years--20% of the limited partnerships Pru-Bache sold. But now that new allegations are surfacing about Darr and Pru-Bache, the number of lawsuits may rise.

Prudential declines to provide an estimate of what it views as Pru-Bache&aposs litigation exposure. Prudential also says in a written statement that it is "unable to respond to questions which deal with matters before the courts."

Prudential attempted to sell its brokerage unit last year. But Pru-Bache&aposs potential total liability played a part in derailing that effort. Parent Prudential refused to cover the cost of settling all suits and claims against Pru-Bache, and no Wall Street rival was willing to shoulder that risk, say two former senior Pru-Bache executives.

CATCH-22. The firm&aposs liabilities may grow if Pru-Bache violated securities laws by not disclosing Darr&aposs involvement with developers. But that&aposs not clear-cut. Securities laws state that "all underwriters are required to make full disclosure of their compensation," says Ira Lee Sorkin, a partner at Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent & Lehrer and former director of the Securities & Exchange Commission&aposs New York office. "The purpose is so that investors know whether they are being solicited because it is a good investment or because the underwriter is getting a piece of the action."

What exactly is considered compensation requiring disclosure is left to the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis. But however the courts rule on the compensation issue, investors may have had a right to know about Darr&aposs potential conflicts of interest. Based on a 1976 U. S. Supreme Court decision, disclosure is required if its omission would significantly alter the mix of information considered by a customer before investing.

Pru-Bache may now find itself in a regulatory catch-22. As is usual, the SEC isn&apost talking about whether it is investigating the brokerage firm. But one former SEC assistant director of enforcement points to a dilemma: The SEC could penalize Pru-Bache if it determines that Darr committed irregularities and the firm did not catch the alleged misdeeds. In effect, that would mean that the firm failed to adequately supervise Darr. On the other hand, if Pru-Bache argues that it knew about the alleged misdeeds and forced out Darr, that could compromise its defense in the partnership lawsuits. It also could be an admission that Pru-Bache didn&apost follow SEC rules that require regulatory filings to be amended to correct previous misstatements or omissions.

MYSTIQUE. Whether Pru-Bache gets into regulatory hot water is of secondary concern to investors who lost money in deals that went sour. "I&aposm on the verge of personal financial destruction," says Dr. William M. Bethea Jr., a Norfolk (Va.) internal medicine specialist who invested $474,000 in eight Pru-Bache partnerships. In a 1990 lawsuit, he charges that all but two of the partnerships are now practically worthless.

Several former Pru-Bache brokers are currently seeking to pin the blame on their employer for products on which they have already collected commissions. One of them claims he has lost clients because he was misled by Pru-Bache about partnerships that are now performing poorly. He is planning to sue his former employer.

Conservative Prudential and commission-driven Pru-Bache always have had different cultures. In 1981, when Prudential acquired Bache, it inherited Darr, who had started Bache&aposs tax-shelter department in 1979. The son of a Worcester (Mass.) shoe salesman, Darr earned a bachelor&aposs degree in history and philosophy at Holy Cross and a graduate certificate in Middle Eastern studies from the University of Utah. He cultivated a tough-guy mystique, often telling stories about being a helicopter and jet pilot during the Vietnam War and working undercover for the Central Intelligence Agency, says Curtis J. Henry Jr., a St. Petersburg (Fla.) businessman who once worked for Darr at Bache. Another former executive in Darr&aposs department, claims that Darr often bragged that he had flown F-4 Phantom jet fighters in Vietnam. To the contrary, however, Air Force records show that Darr spent his active-duty career at Hill Air Force Base in Utah as a logistics officer. Through his attorney, Darr denies having ever made such statements and says: "The substance of those alleged statements is not true." Contacted again by BUSINESS WEEK, Henry and the other source stand by their statements.

Darr was driven by generating volume, since that was the key to his compensation. And by emphasizing Prudential&aposs solid stature in sales literature, he rapidly built a fat book of partnership offerings. In 1982, more good luck came Darr&aposs way when George Ball became his boss. Ball, who had been lured from E. F. Hutton & Co. to run Pru-Bache, had a reputation as a cheerleader for the retail-sales troops, rather than as a forceful disciplinarian. Executives who worked for Darr say Ball used the same light touch with Darr and essentially left him alone. By 1986, Darr&aposs department posted a $40 million profit, more than the rest of Pru-Bache that year.

Other Wall Street firms also were pushing partnerships hard and are now suffering their own litigation hangovers. In the days before the Tax Reform Act of 1986 closed the loophole, losses generated by partnerships could be deducted from investors&apos income taxes. Brokers got hefty commissions of 8% or more, and brokerage houses raked in huge underwriting fees. But the 20% to 30% in up-front commissions and fees made operating profits highly unlikely. Worse, investors may still face nasty tax battles with the Internal Revenue Service if failed partnerships are judged to have been simply a tax-avoidance device. "I sold $800 million worth of this stuff, and none of it is doing well," says one former Pru-Bache regional supervisor.

&aposPERSONAL.&apos Only now are questions surfacing about how Darr chose some of the dozens of powerful general partners who sold their products through Pru-Bache. Consider his relation with Watson & Taylor Realty Co., the Dallas-based development company that teamed up with Pru-Bache to raise nearly $100 million. Watson & Taylor principals included Darr in at least three minimal-risk, high-profit land deals in Texas, say two former Watson & Taylor executives who have seen the company&aposs tax records. Darr also participated in several other Watson & Taylor land ventures by signing loan agreements that entitled him to profits if the deals succeeded and sheltered him from any loss if they failed, say the former employees.

In one instance, Darr invested at least $20,000 in a joint venture called Lombardi No. 3 in November, 1983. Darr knew it was a low-risk transaction, according to the Watson & Taylor employees, because general partner George Watson allegedly had negotiated a contract to sell at a profit the principal asset of Lombardi No. 3--raw land near the Stemmons Freeway, northwest of downtown Dallas. As a result, employees say that Darr received his original investment back within a matter of weeks, and a profit payout of 140% in a little more than a year.

A letter sent by a lawyer at Locke Purnell, the firm hired by Pru-Bache in 1988, to a former high-ranking Watson & Taylor executive makes it clear that Darr was involved in several deals with the Texas developers. The letter says in part: "Watson & Taylor Realty has been cooperating with our firm in this investigation . . . and has provided us with a number of joint venture agreements in which Mr. Darr was a party." Asked about land transactions, Darr told BUSINESS WEEK in a letter dated Jan. 18, 1991: "I consider my investment portfolio to be a strictly personal matter."

Darr&aposs relation with Watson also seemed to come in handy when he bought a $1.8 million house in Greenwich, Conn. Darr borrowed the entire amount in 1984 from FirstSouth F. A., a Pine Bluff (Ark.) S&L in which George Watson and his partner controlled over 25% of the stock. Darr later obtained a $345,000 second mortgage from the same S&L. "George said it was his job to take care of Jim Darr," says a former Watson & Taylor executive, referring to his assistance in arranging the loans. Watson did not respond to BUSINESS WEEK&aposs request for comment on this.

Darr insists that he did not receive preferential treatment. In a written statement, he says the $1.8 million mortgage amounted to a bridge loan, since he applied the proceeds from the sale of his previous home three months later to reduce the balance. And both loans were paid in full by May, 1990, he says. Further, he says he disclosed the transactions to Pru-Bache in advance. Prudential and Pru-Bache declined to respond to questions about this assertion.

Even if Pru-Bache knew about the mortgage arrangement, investors didn&apost. No mention of it is contained in an SEC registration statement filed in 1985 for Prudential-Bache/Watson & Taylor Ltd.-4, an offering that raised $33 million from investors to build and manage miniwarehouse complexes. That particular partnership, beset by operating losses, suspended cash payouts at the end of 1988 after returning only $22.90 per $500 unit and made a minimal cash payment in November, 1990.

UNSCATHED. Disclosure proved to be an issue with another general partner that Darr selected, Clifton Harrison. In April, 1990, a St. Paul federal court judge ordered Pru-Bache to repay $237,000 to a Minneapolis investor because the brokerage failed to disclose that Harrison was a convicted felon. Two internal compliance executives who worked for Darr say they protested sponsoring deals with the Dallas developer because Harrison had been slapped with a five-year prison sentence in 1967 after he pled guilty to embezzling bank funds. Moreover, Harrison had limited real estate experience.

But Peter M. Fass, a New York attorney whose firm did work for Pru-Bache, says he obtained an opinion from the New York State Attorney General&aposs office in the early 1980s that said Harrison&aposs criminal background didn&apost have to be disclosed because he received a Presidential pardon in 1974 from President Ford. That cleared the way for nearly $100 million in Harrison-sponsored partnership deals to be sold by Pru-Bache brokers.

Today, Harrison investors have lost millions. Most of his real estate deals have collapsed or been forced to restructure. But, in one case, Harrison emerged unscathed because Darr and five other Pru-Bache executives ended up buying a majority stake in Harrison&aposs interest in the Barbizon Hotel and an adjacent brownstone in New York.

As it turns out, the 1984 Barbizon transaction extricated Harrison for a time from his personal debt woes and rewarded Pru-Bache insiders with handsome tax breaks. In exchange for the Barbizon stake, Darr and the other Pru-Bache insiders assumed $1.3 million of the debt Harrison owed to another firm that also was selling partnerships through Pru-Bache, according to documents Harrison was required to file in Texas. Pru-Bache insiders were willing to assume the debt because they got lucrative tax credits for the historic rehabilitation project. These would have been wiped out if the Barbizon project had defaulted because of cost overruns.

In addition to Darr, the roster of Pru-Bache insiders participating in the Barbizon deal includes Virgil Sherrill, onetime Pru-Bache vice-chairman Robert J. Sherman, who headed Pru-Bache&aposs retail division at the time and who was Darr&aposs immediate boss until 1986 William Pittman, a onetime due-diligence officer who worked for Darr Richard Sichenxio, the current head of Pru-Bache&aposs retail division and Paul Proscia, who succeeded Darr as head of the direct investment unit.

Once the Barbizon deal was struck, Harrison was able to continue sponsoring partnership deals because he was out from under debt. But that raises a question about how forthright Pru-Bache was in disclosing the deal&aposs significance to investors. Buried on page 49 of a 1985 offering document for the Virgin Isle Hotel venture in the Caribbean that Harrison was marketing through Pru-Bache was this minimal disclosure: "Several officers of agent Pru-Bache have participated with Harrison in one other real estate venture . . . ."

In written responses from their attorneys, Darr and Sherman confirmed that they made the Barbizon investment, but both say it had been cleared in advance by Pru-Bache. The brokerage firm was asked by BUSINESS WEEK for comments about the other participants. However, responding in a letter on behalf of Pru-Bache, Prudential said that Pru-Bache required disclosure of personal investments under certain circumstances. Prudential doesn&apost think it "appropriate to comment on confidential information furnished to us by our employees concerning their personal investments." None of the individuals responded to BUSINESS WEEK&aposs questions. This magazine attempted repeatedly to contact Harrison for comment and sent a letter to his Dallas office listing specific questions. There has been no reply.

Questions about Harrison&aposs dealings with Pru-Bache officials also surfaced in a 1988 Florida lawsuit filed by investors who bought units in the Brazilian Court Hotel in Palm Beach, Fla., against Pru-Bache. Harrison was the general partner in this deal, and the lawsuit claims that "officers and representatives of Pru-Bache&aposs direct-investment group received a series of kickbacks, bribes, and other unlawful inducements and compensations from principals associated with the Brazilian Court Hotel." Neither Darr nor any of the subordinates working for him is specifically named in that lawsuit. Plaintiffs&apos attorneys are currently negotiating a settlement.

Before and after he left Pru-Bache, Ball did not respond to BUSINESS WEEK&aposs questions about his relations with Darr. But he has been dogged once before by queries about how much he knew of activities that occurred when he was president of E. F. Hutton. Questions arose about his role in a 1980 scheme to boost Hutton&aposs interest income by overdrafting branch-office checking accounts at banks around the country. A memo written by Ball turned up years later showing that Ball, then the Hutton president and No. 2 executive, encouraged branches to overdraft local banks to boost profits. Hutton agreed to plead guilty to more than 2,000 felony counts in 1985 and paid a $2 million fine. Ball, who argued that he was not directly responsible for cash management, was issued a censure from the New York Stock Exchange in 1988.

SOURED. While Ball seemed to have paid too little attention to Darr, Darr was noticed by high-level Prudential executives in Newark. Prudential had been an early investor in a small Louisiana oil-drilling company, Graham Resources Inc., and now holds a 15% stake. After Graham teamed up with Pru-Bache in 1983 to raise money for a series of energy partnerships, Prudential initially agreed to invest its own money in the fund alongside the public. For a time, three senior Prudential executives sat on the oversight board that guided the Graham staff in operating the funds. Thanks to promises of yearly double-digit returns, the Energy Income funds raised more than $1.4 billion.

By 1986, the Prudential representatives soured on Darr, says an ex-Prudential source with direct knowledge of the matter. According to this executive, the three left the board that year, after their warnings about Darr went unheeded, at the same time that Prudential moved to stop investing in the funds. "He was more volume-oriented," says the source, "and not as concerned about making sure quality investments were being acquired with the limited partners&apos money."

That insight wasn&apost shared with Pru-Bache customers in the Energy Income funds. Last October, Pru-Bache cut quarterly cash payouts on many of the funds by up to half. Prudential says in a written response that its executives resigned because of changing investment aims, so "Prudential employees on the fund boards were no longer necessary."

As late as 1987, Darr was still a rising star at Pru-Bache. That spring, Ball sent Darr to Harvard business school&aposs prestigious three-month Advanced Management Program. Within months of his return from Boston, however, Texas developers George Watson and Starke Taylor were summoned to Pru-Bache&aposs New York headquarters. Officials of the brokerage firm wanted to strip the Texans of their management role in several underperforming partnerships they co-managed with Pru-Bache, and to use outside managers instead.

After it was clear they would be ousted, Watson coldly asserted that he was getting shabby treatment for someone who had been gracious enough to cover Darr&aposs cash calls on several land deals, says one eyewitness. Pru-Bache Vice-President Frank W. Giordano and General Counsel Loren Schechter said nothing. Within days, lawyers from the Dallas law firm of Locke Purnell, working for Pru-Bache, were combing through Watson & Taylor records. They found that Darr was a participant in a number of land deals with the principals of Watson & Taylor. Prudential declined a request for comments from Schechter and Giordano.

George Watson is now saying little about that inquiry. Watson did not respond to questions about the 1988 Locke Purnell investigation, other than saying: "You should know that Mr. Darr is not a participant in any of the business activities we have ongoing." Locke Purnell lawyers declined to comment.

By Thanksgiving, 1988, only months after the Locke Purnell investigation had begun, Darr left Pru-Bache. The following May, Pru-Bache told the NASD in a regulatory form that it was a voluntary resignation. The brokerage firm also answered "no" when asked if "currently or at termination, was the individual i.e., Darr under internal review for fraud . . . or violating investment-related statutes, regulations, rules, or industry standards of conduct?" If indeed the Locke Purnell probe had ended before Darr&aposs official departure, that may have been a technically correct answer because he was no longer under investigation. But based on information provided to him by BUSINESS WEEK, a former SEC enforcement official says that Pru-Bache may have violated the spirit of the regulation, which requires brokerages to let regulatory bodies know if an employee left as a result of a probe.

GLOWING REPORT. Darr states that he was not forced to leave. In the Jan. 18, 1991, letter to BUSINESS WEEK, he writes: "My departure from Pru-Bache was voluntary, amicable, and on the best of terms, and motivated by my desire to engage in business for myself."

As for Ball, if he was aware of any allegations of Darr&aposs misconduct, it was not evident from his internal memo praising the departing Darr. "We are deeply grateful to Jim," Ball wrote on Nov. 25, 1988. "Simply put, our direct-investment group is the finest in the field. Jim started it, nurtured it, expanded it, and led it. Clients, account executives, and the firm alike have benefited from his talent and accomplishments." Former co-workers say that Darr&aposs severance arrangement entitles him to residual payments from some limited partnerships sold during his regime. Through his attorney, Darr declined comment on his severance package.

Ball&aposs praise of Darr is ironic since the limited partnership debacle has played a major part in Pru-Bache&aposs woes. Sobered by the failed attempt to sell the firm, Ball and Prudential executives agreed late last year to cut back Pru-Bache to its retail brokerage core. That required $370 million in special charges and left Pru-Bache with a $250 million net loss for 1990. The insurance giant had little choice but to pump $200 million in new capital into Pru-Bache late in 1990 hoping profits could be made by concentrating on Pru-Bache&aposs core business.

&aposSTRONG FUTURE.&apos Prudential insists that Pru-Bache has been profitable so far in 1991. And it continues to deny that it is worried about its AAA rating on nearly $10 billion in public debt. But if the Pru-Bache litigation losses mount, it puts more pressure on the performance of Prudential&aposs non-Wall Street investments. Prudential is one of the largest owners of real estate in the U. S. and has a sizable portfolio of junk bonds. Given the mounting problems in those areas, it&aposs not surprising that after surging by $1.14 billion in 1989, the company&aposs capital surplus remained flat last year, at $7.9 billion.

The big question now is whether Beck has simply been brought out of retirement to dispose of Pru-Bache. Prudential is standing by its vow not to sell the firm and indeed changed the broker&aposs name to Prudential Securities Inc. on Feb. 20 to show the firm "has a strong future as part of the Prudential family," says Winters in an official statement. At least in the short term, the surging stock market should lessen the pressure by bringing some investors back. But the residue of ill will from the limited partnership imbroglio won&apost easily be cleansed. Whatever the outcome, it won&apost involve the marketing of new partnerships. Months before he was ousted, Ball ordered the shutdown of Jim Darr&aposs direct-investment fiefdom. They&aposre both gone, but unwinding their legacy is now the costly responsibility of Prudential.


Bache Hamilton Brown was the father of spin fishing in America, the country’s first importer, manufacturer, and promoter of a style of angling that has become the dominant form of fishing in this country. He was one of the most important people in our country’s fishing history, even if he does not always get the recognition that he deserves.

Here, for the first time, Robert Halver details the life and career of this important figure, from his childhood in Europe and America to his discovery of spin fishing in the 1920s to the formation of the first spin tackle company in the nation’s history to the design and manufacture of the first American spinning reel. He was widely acknowledged as THE spinning expert during his lifetime.

The book is divided into three sections: the first covers his introduction and promotion of spin fishing in America, from 1935-1955. The second contains the detailed history of Bach H. Brown fishing tackle, including the first spinning reels made in America (Bache Brown Luxor), his Airex Equip. Corp. tackle, and finally his Ariex/Div. of Lionel tackle. Finally, there are detailed appendices including his entire 1949 daily fishing diary, some of his writings on spin fishing, detailed biographical information on his family, and a collection of original letters to and from Brown.


Nearly five years ago Business Week magazine put to bed a story that would end up touching thousands of individual investors. It would blow the lid off the limited partnership scandal at Prudential-Bache Securities Inc., the brokerage company Prudential Insurance bought in the early 1980s.

More than 300,000 consumers, most of them elderly, retired and on fixed incomes, lost millions of dollars by investing in partnerships Prudential-Bache assured were as safe as the certificates of deposit where many of the retirees previously had kept their life savings. It was a scandal that rippled through the retirement communities of Florida, Arizona, Texas and California, throwing thousands out of their homes and into bankruptcy.

The fraud was the largest financial scandal of the 1980s, the decade that brought us Michael Milken, Ivan Boesky and Charles Keating. But unlike those three, none involved in the Prudential case has yet to darken a prison cell.

Settlement of the investigations launched by state and federal regulators already has cost the company, now known as Prudential Securities, $1.4 billion and the tab is still rising.

While Business Week broke the news of the scandal, it was Kurt Eichenwald, a reporter for The New York Times, who helped keep the heat on throughout the negotiations.

Details are the lifeblood of a reporter's story and Eichenwald, who covered the Milken, Boesky and Keating stories, kept that clearly in focus as he compiled what has become the definitive book on the Prudential affair. He meticulously lists the various players involved and just as meticulously provides the detail to explain how virtually every bit of information was gleaned.

But it's apparent Eichenwald also believes that scandals revealed should carry a moral message and Prudential's is no exception.

"This is a cautionary tale about an abuse of the investor faith that is an essential building block of the American economy. . . . At its essence, it is what allows billions of dollars of securities to trade each day based on nothing more than a voice on the telephone. By taking advantage of that faith, Prudential-Bache cracked the foundation of the marketplace."

The story of Prudential-Bache is a story of greed on an unimagined scale. From 1980 to 1990, Prudential sold $8 billion in limited partnerships, many of which turned out to be virtually worthless.

Eichenwald paints a picture of a company where no one took responsibility for the products being sold and where development of new products was left to the Direct Investment Group, a relatively unknown group headed by James J. Darr, whose only intent was to reward himself. In addition to skimming thousands of dollars from the products, Eichenwald says, Darr took kickbacks from developers who later became the firm's partners. And Eichenwald saves for the end the shocking information that Darr still is receiving payments from Prudential--more than $2 million since 1990.

But like any good detective story, Serpent has a hero--a regulator from Idaho who began investigating after some of the 500 or so Idaho consumers who bought the so-called safe limited partnerships complained about their losses.

From this base, Wayne Klein would head the investigation by state regulators that eventually forced Prudential to its knees. It was the state regulators led by Klein who constantly insisted that investors be made whole to the consternation of regulators from the federal Securities and Exchange Commission, who just wanted to get the investigation behind them.

That's the caveat that Eichenwald adds to his story. While Congress is considering legislation that would exempt many of the country's securities firms from state regulation, it was state regulators who rose to the rescue of Prudential's investors.

Sine die is yet to be written on the Prudential affair. Criminal investigations are still being conducted. But Eichenwald has written a compelling tale, richly laced with details, that shows how trust can be quickly tapped for huge profits by unscrupulous advisers.

"Tillman swallowed hard. He might not know what to tell his clients, but he knew what he would tell his colleagues. He was ready to make enough commotion that by the time he was done, brokers throughout Prudential-Bache--including all of the biggest sellers of Harrison's deals--would find out the truth. The same questions would start to be asked again and again. How could something like this have been kept secret? And where were the people who were supposed to be watching the Direct Investment Group?"

Michigan State LB Joe Bachie signs with New Orleans Saints as UDFA

Only two Michigan State Spartans were selected in the 2020 NFL Draft, but a host of Spartans were quickly signed in free agency after the draft concluded. One such player was MSU co-captain and middle linebacker Joe Bachie, who has signed with the New Orleans Saints as an undrafted free agent.

Bachie was an interesting case heading into the draft. He is a smart player and a great tackler, but he was critiqued by analysts for a lack of on-field speed and for his perceived lack of ability to shed blocks and disrupt plays.

Here is the report, which I first saw from NFL Draft Diamonds:

Michigan State LB Joe Bachie signed with New Orleans Saints

&mdash NFL Draft Diamonds (@DraftDiamonds) April 25, 2020

Bachie had a very successful career with Michigan State before he was suspended for the final five games of his career due to testing positive for PEDs. Bachie will have a shot to prove his doubters wrong with the Saints this season:

Bache Securities Silver Bar 1 Troy oz

These 1 Troy oz .999 fine silver bars were minted for the storied Bache and Company securities firm.

Bache and Company were looking for a White Knight in 1979 to fend off a takeover attempt by the Belzberg family, and ended up in business with Bunker and Herbert Hunt. As we all know, the Hunts attempted to corner the silver market, which they ran up to more than $50 an ounce, from less than $10. Unfortunately Bache extended a quarter of a billion dollars of margin to the Hunts without establishing whether they could produce the cash if need be.

On Jan. 20, 1980, the Commodity Exchange torpedoed the Hunts by forbidding new orders in silver futures except to liquidate existing positions. On Thursday, March 27th 1980 (Silver Thursday) Bache issued a $100 million margin call to the Hunts, which they could not meet. As the price of silver slid to $11, Bache had to dump some of their silver, depressing prices further. Outside speculators began dumping too. In fact a general panic in the commodities and futures markets ensued.

A consortium of US banks provided a $1.1 billion line of credit to the brothers which allowed them to pay Bache which, in turn, survived the ordeal. However, the beleaguered Hunts sold their Bache stock to the Belzbergs, whose holdings thus reached 14 percent.

In desperation, Bache sold out to Prudential (do you remember Prudential-Bache, don't you?), consoling the Belzbergs with a $40 million profit.

These bars have all that history behind them, one of the greatest stories in the history of commodities trading.

We NEVER charge sales tax!

To buy at the 5% lower Check/MO (Cash) price please Email us. We have quantity discounts and free shipping for 10 oz gold or 300 oz of silver!

Have some to sell? Please Email us and let us make you an offer (our buy prices for most common items are here). Selling to Montana Rarities is simple, easy and hassle free.

  • Chris experienced 4 different death/rebirths
  • Chris differentiated 5 levels of the universe
    • The first is at the personal mind, where an ego death happens
    • The second takes places at the collective mind, about species
    • The third level is an archetypal mind, the high subtle mind, moving beyond the species existence
    • The fourth level is causal mind, causal oneness, profound states of non-dual reality
    • The last is Diamond Luminosity, its absolute clarity, pureness
    • Chris says that there is a certain level of support that one needs to truly let go of themselves and let go to the experience
    • He says that he thinks the level of experience will impact the type of support a therapist will be able to give

    Bache Joe Image 3 Aston Villa 1905

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    Stourbridge born inside forward Joe Bache joined Bewdley Victoria in 1898 and Stourbridge in 1899 before signing for Aston Villa for £100 in December 1900, making his Football League debut at Notts County in February 1901. He soon established a regular first team place and was part of the Aston Villa team that won the FA Cup in 1905 beating Newcastle United 2-0 at The Crystal Palace. He scored 20 goals as Aston Villa won the League Championship in 1909-10, and again won the FA Cup with Villa in 1913 when they beat Sunderland at The Crystal Palace. He was also five times a runner up in the League Championship.

    A regular but not prolific goalscorer, his best goalscoring season was 1907-08 when he scored 25 goals in the campaign, finishing as Villa’s leading goalscorer for the season including all four goals in a 4-0 win over Nottingham Forest on Christmas Day 1907 and further hat-tricks against Sheffield Wednesday, Notts County and Liverpool. He was also Villa’s top scorer in 1903-04 and 1908-09 but passed 20 goals only one other time when he scored 22 goals in their 1909-10 campaign.

    He won his first England cap against Wales at Fratton Park in March 1903, scoring in a 2-1 victory, and scored in all of his first four internationals, winning 7 caps for England, the last of which came against Scotland in April 1911. He also made 7 appearances for The Football League.

    Bache appeared 474 times for Aston Villa and had scored a total of 184 goals at the end of his Villa career and also spent some years as club captain, making his final appearance for the club at Newcastle United at the end of April 1915 before the onset of the First World War forced the suspension of peacetime football. Bache joined the Royal Garrison Artillery during the War and went on to serve on the Western Front, where he rose to the rank of Lance-Corporal. Despite being involved in a number of actions, Bache survived the War and returned home after the 1918 Armistice to resume his playing career.

    After spending 1919-20 in South Wales with Mid Rhondda where he was player-manager from June 1919, winning both the Welsh League and the Second Division of the Southern League. Bache then made a brief comeback in the Football League as player-coach of Grimsby Town, joining them in July 1920, playing five games and scoring once before his retirement. He later became a coach in Germany for four years, including a spell with Mannheim from October 1924. After returning from Germany, Bache rejoined Aston Villa as their second-team coach in August 1927 until July 1928.

    Joe Bache Aston Villa coach

    August 1, 1927
    England’s vital need
    Aston Villa realise importance of The Coach
    Have the great English football clubs at last been forced to the conclusion that the coach is a necessity, and that the many well-known players who have been going overseas as instructors are needed at home?

    The Athletic News has urged the importance of the coach for years past, and the poor standard of post-war football has proved the need of such tuition even in the highest grade of the game.

    As the Athletic News has shown during recent weeks there is a trend towards the instruction as distinct from the physical preparation of young players, and an important step has now been taken in this direction by Aston Villa.

    Considerable interest centres in the appointment of Joseph Bache, their former International forward, as coach to the Aston Villa players. That is the specific definition of his appointment: he is to coach the players.

    Bache’s task.
    Of course, he will probably devote more attention to bringing on the junior players than to attempting to teach the seniors new tricks, but even in their eyes good advice properly tendered would never be ignored at least, it would never be ignored by sensible men.

    But Bache has generally to impart the remarkable fund of information – the result of practical performance and experience of the highest class of football – he has acquired to the players associated with the Aston Villa club, and good results are expected to accrue.

    It was strongly felt by the Aston Villa management last season that they were not getting the best results from their reserve players.

    The general consensus of opinion was that they had a fine lot of talent, but the best was not obtained out of that talent.

    The performances given by the reserves, for instances, were not worthy of the men compromising the team.

    A Villa decline.
    There was a time when Aston Villa Reserves were a very attractive side. When Bill Garraty and Bobby Templeton constituted the left wing many people used to go every week the Reserves played they used to say they would rather miss a First Division engagement than a second team game at that particular time.

    The Villa reserves gates have fallen off, and it is hoped that Bache will be the means of bringing the men out, and getting the maximum out of the material at the club’s disposal.

    Bache has the gift of imparting instruction he is an experienced coach, and recently returned from a two years’ stay at Mannheim, in Germany, where he was very successful.

    And revival?
    He speaks very highly of the treatment he received there. Bache describes several of the South German teams as being very clever, and, generally speaking, superior to those of North Germany.

    “They often beat English touring teams,” he says, “but they would not beat them if they met them week after week. The point is that the German teams put forth every ounce of effort, while the English tourists are apt to take things quietly.”

    Aston Villa’s step will be followed with the greatest interest. With the appointment of Bache and the arrival of Jimmy Gibson, the great young Scottish international from Partick Thistle, it is not difficult to see the beginning of a definite Villa revival.
    (The Athletic News: August 1, 1927)

    Joe Bache, Aston Villa’s new coach.

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